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Introduction
According to Paul Avis, the imagination has gone through the ringer in both modernity
and post modernity. Modernity “assumes a dichotomy between rational discourse, on the one
hand, and imagistic thinking, on the other. It privileges logos over against eidos. The former is
hailed as the vehicle of knowledge, mastery and progress; the latter dismissed as the source of
ignorance, superstition and illusion.”1 Post modernity, on the other hand, has attacked narrative
and “An attack on narrative is an attack on metaphor, symbol and myth…Post modernity is
clearly as inhospitable to a realist (reality-referring, truth-bearing) concept of imaginative truth
as is the modernity deriving from the Enlightenment.”2 In other words, the imagination has been
largely devalued as a cognitive device. Throughout my life, I have felt most prevalently the
modern attitude toward the imagination. It has seemed to me that conceptions of the imagination
have stopped short of all that the imagination is truly capable of. Authors such as Paul Avis have
helped me to begin to articulate what those capabilities are. My interest in the imagination has
prompted many further questions particularly in the realm of epistemology. And it is these
questions that have lead to this paper, and to considering the Eunomian controversy. It is my
belief that the imagination and epistemology are deeply tied together and the Eunomian
controversy will allow for an exploration of the way in which the two are connected.
Within the Trinitarian debates of the 4th century, perhaps one of the most hotly contested
topics was epistemology, and more specifically theological epistemology. How can a theologian
know God? How much of God can the theologian know? What aspects of God can be known?
Can God’s essence be known by humanity? What does the process of knowing God look like?
No-where were these questions more central than in the debate between the Cappadocian Fathers
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and Eunomius of Cyzicus that occurred from 361-383 known as the Eunomian Controversy. The
debate centered on the understanding of the term epinoia and what power, if any, epinoetic
thinking had to say something about God. In this paper, I will argue that epinoia or epinoetic
thinking can be understood as the imagination or as imaginative thinking. Furthermore, the main
case which will be made in this paper is that the Cappadocian Fathers based on their
understanding of creation, believe the imagination (epinoia) is the greatest tool of the human
intellect and the best and only way for human beings to speak positively of God.
In order to show this to be the case, we will begin by examining the term epinoia. We
will consider the history of the use of the word, the implications of those uses for the meaning of
the term, and the connection of epinoia with the imagination. Then, we will briefly place the
Eunomian controversy in its context by discussing the Council of Nicaea and the events which
ensued. It is from this discussion where we can launch into the use of epinoia by Eunomius of
Cyzicus and the Cappadocian Fathers. Having analyzed the understanding of the term which
both sides held, we will conclude with some thoughts regarding the Cappadocians conception of
epinoia and the imagination for today.
Epinoia: A History
The word epinoia is translated into English as the word conception, or conceptualization,
yet like most words, there is more to understanding the term than simply translating it. The use
of epinoia has its origins in Neo-Aristotelian thought; the term gained popularity in
commentaries made on Aristotle’s thought. 3 In this context, an epinoia was that which captured
the mental existence of an object. It was cultivation of a mental image of an object into a mental
abstraction of that object. Demetracopoulos emphasizes that epinoetic thinking does not just
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break down into mental abstractions that which is observed, but also takes into account the
temporal aspect of epinoia. As being located in time, epinoetic thinking determines the past,
present and future aspects of a thing perceived.4 Thus it is a cognitive, epistemological moment
after the initial perception of an object that refines an object into aspects as they exist in time.
Mortley speaks of the term as, “a neo-Aristotelian technical term, and it means thinking about
things in the abstract, as a response to the fact of things (a response which is inevitably
subsequent to the existence of things). It is an after-thought, as opposed to a prior notion.”5
According to Vaggione, epinoia spoke of something that did not exist in the concrete sense, so it
was not fully real.6 That is not to say it was completely and utterly fictitious, but that it had an
immaterial, inside the mind existence that was less real than something concrete and actual.7
Finally, the process of epinoetic thinking or epinoia is necessarily tied up with the
concept of naming, especially in the category of theology. Conceptualizations result in the use of
language to speak of something. Epinoetic thinking is the process of conceptualizing something
and an epinoia is the result of that conceptualizing. The epinoia which is the product of the
human mind results in speaking that product. The product which is spoken is the name given to
an object. For example, if we are to say that Christ is the vine, vine would be the epinoia. Vine is
also a name of Christ, but it began with conceptualizing. The name necessarily started with
epinoetic thinking and then moved to be something stated. Hence, Eunomius makes a distinction
between calling the Father unbegotten “in name alone,” and in speaking of it as His essence.
The epinoia is the name of that object which was perceived and then conceptualized.
4
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Theologian’s Use of Epinoia
Origen is one of the first theologians documented using the term and his use seems to
support both Vaggione and Mortley’s analysis of its historical uses and origins. Origen (185-254
CE) used the term epinoia in order to speak of the multitude of descriptions for Christ in the
Bible, such as “door,” “way,” etc,.8 Along with that, he also used the term to condemn those who
believed and spoke of the distinction between Father and Son as existing only epinoetically.9 The
use in the Commentary on John especially exemplifies the understanding that epinoia only exist
secondarily as opposed to concretely. Ayres also cites Clement of Alexandria (150-215 CE) as a
theologian who used the term to define divine knowing.10 Perhaps the most relevant use of
epinoia prior to the Eunomian controversy was in the epistemology of Basil of Ancyra (362 CE),
the great Homoiousian theologian. Basil holds that concepts (ἒννοιαι or epinoiai) are the realm in
which we know God. For Basil, correct concepts are formed when we grasp these concepts apart
from any material, corporeal or temporal undertones.11 Basil advocates a type of knowing which
uses epinoia in order to indirectly describe the generation of the Son from the Father. Given
epinoia’s placement as secondarily real, he does not have far to go from his epistemology to
form his belief that the best way to describe the Son’s essence is that it is like essence
(homoiousios), a term that is by nature ambiguous. Homoiousios seems to be this middle ground
which leaves some room for interpretation as to the way in which the Son is similar to the Father.
Epinoia is the key; it gives Basil a way to speak in a way that is less real than a concrete physical
reality.
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Epinoia as “Fiction” and “Science”
In terms of its etymology, the word is fairly straightforward. Epinoia is that which
follows the first perception of an object, which would be known as noesis.12 It is the conceptual
thinking done after the fact of an initial intuition or perception of an object. The abstractions or
conceptions formed by the process of thinking epinoetically were still considered real, yet on a
secondary sense to that which is concrete. It was used by theologians and philosophers alike
prior to Eunomius in such a fashion. The term is problematic by nature. As a mode of thought
which is after the fact, it can produce what Mortley refers to a “fiction.”13 That is, it is not the
object itself, there is space or distance between the actual moment of perception and the
abstraction created. At the same moment, epinoia can rightly be considered what Mortley calls
“science.”14 That is despite its potential for creating fiction, conceptualization after the fact does
have some positive epistemological power. Something can be known by way of epinoetic
thinking. It is secondarily real, but it is real nonetheless. It has productive power, yet its product
is always distanced from the object which it seeks to know. E.C.E. Owen’s definition of epinoia
is a good summation of what we have considered to be the meaning of the term thus far.
Conception is the method by which we discover things that are unknown, going on to
further discoveries by means of what adjoins to and follows from our first perception. For
when we have formed some idea of what we seek to know, harmonising what follows to
the first result of our discoveries, we gradually conduct our inquiry to the end of our
proposed research.15
This definition highlights the in between nature of conception, as well as its ability to incorporate
and synthesize all it is that we know. In this way, epinoia is resting on a knife’s edge, always
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threatening to fall into the realm of fiction at any time; to remain in the realm of reality (or
“science”) is what is at stake.
Epinoia and the Imagination
The imagination is not a concept that is easily defined either. It is perhaps most
commonly thought of as a tool which produces fiction alone. It has connotations of poetry, the
theatre and fantasy fiction novels. Yet it is undoubtedly more than these things. The expanse of
its power stretches far wider than producing beautiful prose or great stories. Kevin Vanhoozer’s
definition provides an excellent starting point for the discussion. The definition gives a satisfying
explanation of what it is the imagination does in the process of knowing. From there, we can
begin to draw the connection between the imagination and the concept of epinoia.
Vanhoozer defines the imagination as, “that cognitive faculty that allows us to see as a
whole what those who lack imagination see only as unrelated parts.”16 The imagination is thus
the great synthesizer of information. It is that which sees and forms connections between
concepts. In that sense, it functions within creation, in the “vortex of possibilities.”17 It can
conceive of things past and present. Rather than being simply a creator of images, which results
in simple reproduction or complete fiction, the imagination has the capacity to produce
something real. It has a power to produce and conceive of more than what is immediately
perceived. The imagination is massively important in arriving at correct knowledge of the world,
for, “perception is paradoxical: in our knowledge of the physical world, we are receptive but not
passive, constructive but not inventive.”18 When we perceive objects all the time with our senses,
our imagination is constantly making connections, and also constructing or producing
16
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connections to come to a greater understanding of the world. The imagination is thus vital for life
and an immense gift which we have received.
The connections between epinoia and the imagination begin with their location in the
middle of perception and production, or between receiving and construction. They work after the
fact, and thus have distance from the event or object about which they are conceiving and
making connections. Both terms have the ability to produce fiction or science, that is, there is an
ethical element to the imagination and to epinoia.19 That is to say, there is an element of danger
in using epinoia or the imagination because both walk the line between fiction and science. We
are required to think wisely about what we say when using this faculty because of the potential
that exists in uttering falsities; this danger will be elaborated on more by the Cappadocian
Fathers later. Along with that and most importantly, the two terms result in the creation of
metaphor. They use the vortex of possibilities in which they are enmeshed in order to understand
that which is perceived. As the faculty which conceptualizes, the imagination requires the use of
previously lived experiences, previously perceived objects in order to understand further that
which is perceived. This is where the metaphor is created. Conceptualization always results in
relating one thing to another. Imagination and epinoia share this process.
Epinoia makes mental abstractions after the fact and then speaks them in language.
Imagination does the same thing. Thus epinoia can be understood as a type of intelligent
imagination. Referring back to the definition given by Vanhoozer, epinoia and thus the
imagination are that fundamental human cognitive tool, for above all else they allow us to
function in the world in which we live, they allow for some organization of the vast and
seemingly infinite number of possibilities.
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Historical Background of the Eunomian Controversy
The Cappadocian Fathers are made up of three men from the region of Cappadocia in
Eastern Asia Minor. Basil of Caesarea (329/330-379 CE) is the eldest of the trio and is the older
brother of Gregory of Nyssa. Gregory of Nazianzus (329-389/390 CE) is the second oldest of the
three. He and Basil of Caesarea became great friends while growing up attending school together
and remained friends until Basil’s death. Gregory of Nyssa (335-395 CE) is the youngest and is
the younger brother of Basil of Caesarea. All three men are historically located in the time
between two major Councils, the Council of Nicaea (325 CE) and the Council of Constantinople
(381 CE). Eunomius of Cyzicus (333-393 CE) lived during the same time period. Theologians
were very busy in the fourth century, and there is an inexhaustible fount of theology which can
be examined from this time period. We will briefly track the major theological arguments being
made for the nature of God running throughout the debates in order to arrive at Eunomius’
entrance onto the scene.
The Trinitarian debates at their core were about the nature of God; theologians had
questions regarding how Jesus Christ related to God the Father. Most simply put, if God is one,
how can we also say that Jesus Christ is God? When the debates began with Arius of Alexandria
(260-336 CE) and Alexander of Alexandria (d. 328 CE) in 318 CE there were at least four
distinct ways of answering that question. Lewis Ayres calls these four ways of answering that
question the four “trajectories.”20 These four trajectories will be vital in tracking the theological
themes of the Trinitarian debates as Eunomius of Cyzicus will emerge from one of these four
trajectories later in the debates.
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The Four Trajectories
The first of Ayres’ trajectories is the party of Alexander, Athanasius and their supporters.
Ayres places this trajectory within the trend of theology that emphasizes the Son’s likeness to the
Father as opposed to emphasizing the difference between the two.21 The Son is begotten in a way
that is natural to the Father, and thus they share a nature in some way. While this trajectory
shares much in common with what will be known as Nicene, the Alexandrians do not use much
ousia language and the idea of three members of the Trinity as distinct, individual hypostases is
noticeably absent from their thought.
The second trajectory identified is the Eusebian trajectory or the trajectory of the “One
Unbegotten.” This is the trajectory in which Arius would fall along with Eusebius of Nicomedia
(d. 341 CE), Eusebius of Caesarea (260-339/40 CE) and Asterius (d. 341 CE), notably. This is
the trajectory in the most direct contrast to the Alexandrian position. For these theologians, the
Son is not begotten naturally of the Father, but by his will. This faction does not hesitate to use
hypostasis language and Arius’ in particular speaks of the Father and Son as being two distinct,
individual and hierarchical hypostases.22 It is important to note that while this party would later
be labeled Arian by Athanasius of Alexandria (303-373 CE), a more fair assessment would be
that they are not Arian by definition, but that their theology allowed for the rise of an Arian
position in Arius.
The third trajectory is called the Marcellan or the “Undivided Monad” trajectory. As the
name betrays, this trajectory sought to ensure that the unity of God was upheld. Thus, hypostasis
language was used only to declare the unity of God. Eustathius of Antioch (c. 300 CE) and
Marcellus of Ancyra (d. 374 CE) would declare that God is only one, unified hypostasis. The

21
22

Ibid., 43.
R.P.C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988), 10.

10

Son is described mostly as the Word, or reason of God. As a result, he is also eternally present
with the Father as an individual’s reason is always with him or her. This trajectory differs from
the Alexandrian position in that Marcellus is not comfortable with talk of generation when
speaking of the Son, which would breach the unity of God.23
The final trajectory which Ayres identifies is the only trajectory which comes distinctly
from the Western half of the Roman Empire. It is known as the “Anti-adoptionism” trajectory.
This party of theologians seems most interested in affirming and upholding the divinity of Jesus,
as opposed to the use of Jesus by the divine power to work salvation.24 Novation and Lactantius
are cited as major proponents of this trajectory, having inherited terminology from Tertullian.
These four trajectories were awoken by the conflict between Arius and Alexander which
was sparked by the preaching of Arius (part of the Eusebian trajectory), a presbyter in
Alexander’s (part of the Alexandrian trajectory) see regarding the nature of Christ. While
Alexander believed the Son to be equal to the Father, Arius taught a radical subordination of the
Son to the Father.25 What incited such outrage from Alexander was Arius’ spreading of the idea
that there was a time when the Son did not exist.26 This radical subordination and creaturely
status given to Jesus Christ is what defines the Arian position. The Council of Nicaea was called
in direct response to the debate between Arius and Alexander. We can see the Creed which was
produced at Nicaea as a stimulus, awakening the two other trajectories who believed they could
answer the question of God’s nature. Nicaea became the official statement of the Church but was
first and foremost a response to the Arian controversy directly,27 as a result two schools of
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thought were necessarily cut out of the decision making process. The result was more debate
with all four schools of thought now involved. The years following Nicaea became a battle
ground regarding the Trinity characterized by the use of polemical writing and political
undercutting.28
Most important for our discussion however is the defeat of the Arian position. Arius
appears to have been an isolated figure theologically.29 He had contact with Eusebius and
Nicomedia and Eusebius of Caesarea, especially following the banishment from Alexandria.
While the Eusebian trajectory was certainly closer theologically to Arius, they ultimately do not
go as far as he does in the subordination of Christ to the Father. Therefore, despite the polemics
of Athanasius, which labeled the Eusebian trajectory as Arian,30 the radical Arian position was
ended at Nicaea. Such a radical position would not resurface and gain the sort of attention Arius
received until the late 350s CE. It is to this position that we now turn.
The Homian and Heterousian Positions
In the late 350s, two positions emerged which have come to be labeled as Neo-Arian.31
While the name is up for debate,32 the two undoubtedly are the return of something as radical as
the Arian position as articulated by Arius himself. The two positions can be called Homian and
Heterousian.
The first party to emerge clearly was the Homoian party. Their coming out party was the
second Sirmium Council held in 357.33 The first Sirmium Council in 351 could perhaps be the
28
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very roots of the party’s emergence, but the product of the second Sirmium Council holds the
incontrovertible evidence of its debut. The creed produced by this council avoids ousia language
which provides a good starting point for discussing the theology of the Homoian party. The
center around which Homoian theology turns is the incomparability of God the Father.34 The
Father in Homoian theology is above the Son and Spirit and thus the two cannot share an
essence. The Homoians stress little to no commonality between the Father and Son.35 The
Sirmium creed and thus the Homoian party is characterized as Arian because of the drastic
subordination of the Son. The lack of commonality between the Son and the Father, the
incomparability of the Father and the lack of biblical usage of the term lead to the Homoian
condemnation of the ousia. The leading figures of the Homoian party can be identified as
Eudoxius of Antioch (d. 370 CE) and Akakius (also, Acacius) of Caesarea (d. 366 CE).
The second party to emerge was the Heterousian party. The Heterousian party can be
considered a more radical offshoot of the Homoian party with a few major differences. In fact,
the Heterousian party originated within the Homoian party. Eudoxius of Antioch promoted and
hosted Aetius of Antioch (d. 366 CE), the main proponent of this party’s ideas, making him a
presbyter in his church.36 It should also be noted, this is the party to which Eunomius belonged.
We will simply place him here for now, and return to a greater focus on his particular theology
following the conclusion of the historical background. Unlike the Homoians, Heterousians were
unabashed in their use of the term ousia and supported the use of the term as a way to explain the
ontological and essential difference between the Father and the Son.37 And in classical Arian
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terminology, they also would have held to the three hypostases of the Father, Son and Spirit. As
a result, Heterousians held to a much more radical form of subordinationism that the Homoians.
The most identifiable characteristic of the Heterousian party is their conception of the
term agennetos (translated unbegotten) as the essence of God. This was the lynchpin in their
radically Arian theology. Aetius and Eunomius claimed every creature had access to God’s
essence, and his essence was unbegotten.38 Such a claim made the Son, one who was begotten, a
categorically different and separate from God’s essence. Therefore the most vital point in the
Heterousian position is that God is fundamentally and essentially unbegotten.
The Council of Seleucia (359-360 CE) along with the politics of the church brought these
two parties to the forefront of the debate.39 The Council of Seleucia, called by the Emperor
Constatius was largely a failed attempt at organic unity. However, Akakius of Caesarea, along
with Constantius made sure that unity would be achieved inorganically. Together, they crafted a
creed known as the Creed of Nice (also, Niké) and forced those involved in the Council to sign
it. The results of the Creed of Nice bring us to Eunomius’ entrance into the story. Following
Nice, a council was held in Constantinople which was supervised by Akakius of Caesarea.40 The
council was essentially the Homoian victory celebration, in which everyone who was against the
party was punished. Basil of Ancyra was deposed and banished along with his allies and
supporters while Eudoxius was made bishop of Constantinople. Aetius was banished as well, for
his outspoken use of ousia language and possibly as an outgoing request of Eustathius of
Antioch. Yet, Aetius’ disciple Eunomius was not banished at the council. Instead he was made
bishop of Cyzicus within a year of the council being adjourned. It is likely that Eunomius gave
his Apologia as a defense of his position. The Apologia may have been at least partially
38
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responsible for his ordination.41 Whether or not it was given at Constantinople in 360, the
Apologia was likely published in 361 or 362.
Thus, we have arrived at Eunomius, a member of the newest expression of radical
Arianism. He has been placed as bishop over the see at Cyzicus, and is now free to disperse and
teach his ideas on the nature of God. His thoughts come down the long line of thought in the
fourth-century regarding the questions of God’s nature. Therefore, we conclude our historical
background section and move into Eunomius’ theology and attempt to explain how he
understood the relation of the Son to the Father.
Eunomius’ Theology
Eunomius’ theology is essentially an articulation of the previously discussed Heterousian
theology. A few quotes from his Apologia will be considered now in order to explicate
Eunomius’ theology in more detail. While discussing the quotes, it will be vital to keep in mind
two things. First his epistemology and second, the major thrust of Eunomius’ theology. First,
Eunomius believes that it is possible for human beings to know something’s essence, including
God.42 Second, Eunomius believes that God’s essence is known in the word agennetos
(unbegotten/ingenerate). That is the centerpiece of his theology. The unbegottenness of God is
the presupposition that holds together his theory of knowledge, and his understanding of God. It
is what he holds to most tightly. The first quote articulates Eunomius conception of what it
means to be unbegotten:
Therefore it is in accordance with both the natural notion and the teaching of the fathers
that we have confessed that God is one and that he did not come into existence either
from himself or from another. Each of these alternatives, you see, is equally impossible,
since according to truth the maker must pre-exist what comes into existence, and what is
made must be secondary to the maker. A thing cannot be prior or posterior to itself, and
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no other thing can be prior to God. If there were such a thing, it, rather than the second,
would surely have the dignity of divinity.43
Eunomius explanation of why God is unbegotten is grounded in his pre-existence. God not only
pre-exists all things, but also his own being. This argument appeals to “truth” which seems to be
something like logical argument. If there is a something which caused the creation of God, that
something would have the “dignity of divinity” rather than the Father. God’s essence according
to Eunomius lies here in his unbegottennesss. Eunomius must clarify that God does indeed preexist his own being in order to be able to say the Son did not exist before himself. He was
formed at this begetting.44 That is, Christ was created; he did not exist before the Father created
him. He is begotten and because he was caused by something which pre-existed himself, the Son
cannot be God. Therefore, Christ is fundamentally and ontologically different than the Father.
Thus he is able to say with confidence:
But if God is unbegotten as in the preceding demonstration, he could never admit a
begetting which would result in his giving a share of his own proper nature to the one
who is begotten, and he would escape all comparison or fellowship with the one who is
begotten.45
In this quote, one can see Eunomius’ clear distinction of the unbegotten nature of the Father and
what that means for the Son. Not only can the Father and Son share nothing in essence, but they
are totally unequal to the point of the Son being excluded from any conversation regarding the
Father.
Less central in the quote is the concept of the divine simplicity. Eunomius does not
believe that God has any composition within him. God does not bestow a share of himself or his
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nature because he does not have composition, which would imply conflict within God.46 Divine
simplicity is one of the reasons Origen employed the term epinoia to speak of the names of
Christ. It kept Christ from becoming composite. Origen could then affirm the reality of Christ’s
names in the Bible and also maintain the simplicity of God. This further supports Eunomius
argument. Not only does the Son’s essence as begotten preclude any commonality with the
Father, but the Father’s essence precludes any begetting happening in it. 47 Thus Christ in no
way can share in essence with the Father.
Eunomius’ Understanding of Epinoia
That is Eunomius’ doctrine of God. Having established that, we can now begin to discuss
the role of epinoia in his expression of the Trinity. The term is not used by Eunomius at great
length. In fact, the term only has a negative role in Eunomius’ theology, that is, Eunomius uses
epinoia to say what he does not mean. Here is the quote which we will focus on as the epicenter
of Eunomius’ usage and conception of the term epinoia:
When we say ‘unbegotten,’ we do not intend to honor God in name alone by human
conceptualization (epinoia); rather, we intend to repay him the most necessary debt of all,
namely, confessing that he is what he is. Things said by way of conceptualization
(epinoia), you see, have an existence in name alone and when they are being pronounced,
and by nature, are dissolved together with the sounds used to say them.48
Including the passage quoted above, Eunomius only uses the term epionia three times in the
Apologia and never defines it explicitly. To understand Eunomius’ thoughts on epinoetic
thinking and the imagination, we will begin with the above quote and make some general
observations. Following that, we will consider the backdrop to Eunomius’ understanding: his
theology of names. As stated earlier, names are necessarily tied up in epinoia and thus,
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understanding how Eunomius conceives of the reality of names will allow us to precisely point
to the role of epinoetic thinking in his doctrine of God. So to begin, we will again quote
Eunomius in the Apologia:
When we say ‘unbegotten,’ we do not intend to honor God in name alone by human
conceptualization (epinoia); rather, we intend to repay him the most necessary debt of all,
namely, confessing that he is what he is. Things said by way of conceptualization
(epinoia), you see, have an existence in name alone and when they are being pronounced,
and by nature, are dissolved together with the sounds used to say them.49
Eunomius is unmistakably critiquing the power or ability of imagination to speak constructively
of God. He is very careful to say the way in which he is speaking of God is not in human
conceptualizations. The most obvious critique present in this passage is of the correspondence of
human conceptualizations to reality. Eunomius believes human conceptualizations can only
produce that which is false. Human conceptualizations are seen as vain grasping that miss the
true way of knowing. As discussed above, the ability of epinoetic thinking to produce “fiction” is
expressed and emphasized by Eunomius. The only truly valuable way of knowing God is in
knowing his essence.
In discussing Eunomius’ conception of the term epinoia, Vaggione writes that for
Eunomius if, “we say that there is a word which applies uniquely to God (‘Unbegotten,’ say, or
‘Only true God’), but we also say that this word is an epinoia (a product of only human thought),
we are in effect saying that ‘God’ is an idea we construct, rather than a reality we apprehend.”50
If Eunomius did indeed first give his Apologia at the Council of Constantinople in 361, this
would have been a wise maneuver, as this seems to be critiquing the Marcellan, or Homoousian
position. He would have truly distinguished between the Father and Son in more than just mode.
As a result of the Homian victory at Seleucia, the Marcellan position which named God as only
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having one hypostases resulted in deposition and exile. By emphasizing the real and factual
distinction of the persons of the Trinity, Eunomius would have been avoiding the Marcellan
position. Perhaps this is part of what got him appointed bishop of Cyzicus.
Eunomius’ Theory of Names
We have now laid out Eunomius’ critique of epinoia and thus, the imagination, but
behind the critique sits a framework of naming which will further elucidate the role epinoia plays
in Eunomius’ theology. Eunomius believes in a simple straight line from the doctrine of divine
simplicity to the definition of God’s essence.51 This comes in the form of a name of God,
unbegotten. According to Eunomius, names have been in existence prior to man being in
existence and they communicate essence.52 The names are given by God.53 Thus, the type of
name which Eunomius is speaking of when he speaks the name “unbegotten” refers to God’s
essence directly. In addition Eunomius is communicating that “unbegotten” was the given name
for God in the cosmos prior to the creation of humanity. God is who he is, unbegotten is the
expression of that.
By disntiction, epinoia are after-thoughts. They are that type of name which are not given
directly by God, but are invented by humankind. In such case, conceptualizations do not apply to
God’s essence and are seen by Eunomius as inferior to that type of knowing which is given by
God through names prior to the creation of humanity. In that sense, Eunomius can be seen as
attempting to construct an objective theory of language. However, rather than the arrogant, selfassuming theologian who claims complete and utter knowledge of God as painted by the
polemical writings of the Cappadocians, a more accurate picture of Eunomius may be of a man
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searching for some non-symbolic way of knowing God.54 He did not deny conceptualizations all
together but relegated them to a lesser place. He wanted to safeguard against the idea that God
could be a human invention if conceptualization is the only way of speaking of him.55
I believe this to be a fairer characterization of Eunomius. His estimation of the
imagination is not so completely disparaging and withering so as to conjoin him with those who
would do away with the imagination (such as those today who understand it to be nothing but
idle fancy). For, while he speaks harshly of epinoia in the above polemic, by all accounts, he still
had a place for epinoia in his epistemology. Yet, when talking about God, he wanted to affirm
that there exists at least one way to know God that is not symbolic by nature.56 Therefore, we can
speak of Eunomius’ conception of the imagination and its role in theology as secondary to the
type of knowing he would define as certain. That is, the knowledge given directly from God in
the names assigned to his various creations is seen as the strongest and most useful tool of the
theologian as opposed to human and thus created conceptions. His position can be summed up as
follows: some concepts strike directly at an object’s essence and are uncreated and given by God,
while other concepts are created by mankind and have no power to say anything of an object’s
essence.
The Cappadocian Fathers
Having finished analyzing Eunomius’ ideas regarding the imagination and the term
epinoia and its use in theology, we can now move to the other side of the debate. Basil of
Caesarea, his friend Gregory of Nazianzus, and Basil’s brother Gregory of Nyssa comprise the
group known as the Cappadocian Fathers. Before moving to discuss their use of epinoia in
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theology, we will briefly give the background of each man, placing them in the context of the
history previously discussed in this paper. All three men were from the region of Cappadocia.
Basil was the elder brother of Gregory of Nyssa. He studied rhetoric along with Gregory of
Nazianzus and that was largely the focus of his younger life. However, as he grew, he took an
interest in asceticism which brought him into contact with Eustathius of Sebaste and Basil of
Ancyra. It is believed Basil of Caesarea attended the council of Constantinople in 361 where he
encountered the arguments of the Heterousians as well as the Homoians.57 His associations
would place him in the Homoiousian party and it is likely that is where he resided until
becoming pro-Nicene and even supporting the term homousios.58
Gregory of Nyssa was the younger brother of Basil of Caesarea. It is likely that he was a
good deal younger than Basil given the manner in which he spoke of him and the fact that he
seems to have studied under Basil when he was teaching rhetoric.59 Gregory became bishop of
Nyssa in 372. As far as his role in the larger Nicene event, Gregory obviously was a player much
later in the game, but he became a theologian who was in favor of the language and would later
affirm Nicaea at the Council of Constantinople. It is likely that he joined the debate with
Eunomius by writing Contra Eunomium in 380 or 381 in response to Eunomius’ Apologia
Apologiae.60
The third father was Gregory of Nazianzus. As stated earlier, he was good friends with
Basil of Caesarea and the two studied together as they grew up. Gregory’s father was bishop of
Nazianzus. Gregory never seems to have been interested in ecclesial matters, but under the
pressure of Basil, he became bishop of Sasima in 372. He would also serve as bishop of

57

Hanson, The Search, 680.
Ayres, Nicaea, 195.
59
Hanson, The Search, 715.
60
Ibid., 717.
58

21

Nazianzus after his father’s death and later at Constantinople for a very short time.61 Gregory
never participated directly in the debate with Eunomius, but we will consider a poem of his
which displays the ways in which the Cappadocians would have constructed theological
language in light of their thoughts on epinoia and the imagination.62
Cappadocian Understanding of Epinoia
Underlying Understanding of the World
As was the case with Eunomius, the role of epinoia in theology depends on a framework
of creation which undergirds and grounds the way the Cappadocians use the term. In other
words, the way the Cappadocians understand the world is fundamental to understanding their
thoughts on the imagination. Whereas Eunomius held to a view of the world and language which
gave some direct and simple path to the essence of the Creator, the Cappadocians held to no such
view. Hans Urs Von Balthasar opens his famous essay on Gregory of Nyssa, “Presence and
Thought,” with the line, “Every time he undertakes a development of the fundamentals of his
metaphysics, Gregory begins from the irreducible opposition between God and creature.”63
Gregory of Nyssa’s Contra Eunomium contains the clearest articulation of the Cappadocian
conception of creation and language as unable to access the essence of God. He writes:
For the gap is great and impassable by which the uncreated nature is hindered from the
created essence. The one is limited, the other has no limit; the one is circumscribed by its
own proper limitations according to the decision of the wise creator, the other has infinity
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as its measurement; the one is stretched out by a certain dimensional extension, being
enclosed by space and time, the other transcends every notion of dimension.64
Gregory sees the creation as hindered from the essence of the Creator on account of the created
nature of the creation. The creation on account of being the creation which is enclosed in space
and time, cannot know the essence of the creator who is outside space and time, outside creation
or dimensionality. The two terms Gregory uses to describe the creation are διάστημα (diastema)
and κίνησις (kinesis). Diastema refers to the spatial and temporal dimension of creation. All of
creation is in the dimension of space and time, and as a result, it cannot be escaped. All thinking
and speaking occur within the diastema. Kinesis refers to the constant movement of creation.
This does not refer to the literal spinning and moving of the earth, but rather the constant tension
in which creation rests between its beginning and its end. As a result of having a beginning,
creation is always moving, if it were to stop moving, it would cease to exist.65 A beginning is
going from non-being to being, which is an act of movement, creation is always in this
movement. God on the other hand, is not only outside the diastema, but he is adiastemic. There
is no part of him which is diastemic. The division is ontological. God is free in his constitution of
diastema whereas humanity is trapped within the diastema and is constituted entirely of that
which is diastemic and kinetic.
As a result of this understanding of the world, the Cappadocians do not simply regard the
essence of God as incomprehensible, but they also believe that to speak of God’s essence, to
claim that we can name it is dangerous. Gregory writes,
Thus the whole created order is unable to get out of itself through a comprehensive
vision, but remains continually enclosed within itself, and whatever it beholds, it is looking at
itself. And even if it somehow thinks it is looking at something beyond itself, that which it sees
64

Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, I, 246, 14-21, as cited in Scot Douglass, Theology of the Gap:
Cappadocian Language Theory and the Trinitarian Controversy (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Company, 2005),
33.
65
Douglass, Theology of the Gap, 46.

23

outside itself has no being…For every object it conceptually discovers, it always comprehends
the diastema inherent in the being of the apprehended object, for diastema is nothing other than
creation itself.66
Thus the danger in espousing that language can get at God’s essence is that when we speak we
are really only speaking of ourselves! The danger lies in creating an essence of God which is not
his true essence, but rather an essence which is built of “createdness.” That “god” has no being at
all, but is simply the fiction that Eunomius so deeply desires to avoid. To say that language can
define and enclose the essence of God, to speak of something outside the diastema as being
defined in total by language, is idolatry at its root. The question is vital because it has everything
to do with whom we pray to when we pray, whom we worship and whom we share with others.
The Cappadocians understand this danger and thus are very quick and poised in their response to
Eunomius.
Epinoia and the Imagination as Theological Tool
For Gregory then, humanity exists in the middle of a day that is guarded on both ends by
the darkness of night.67 In other words, humanity is in this place of constant motion in which no
direct knowledge of God is possible. The nature of creation restricts it from a direct knowledge
of God’s essence. It is at this point, where the Cappadocian conception of epinoia plays a vital
role. In Basil’s Adversus Eunomius, the first response of a Cappadocian Father to the thoughts of
Eunomius, Basil defends conceptualizations as follows:
The term ‘conceptualization,’ however, is far from being restricted only to vain and nonexistent imaginations. After an initial concept has arisen for us from sense perception, the
more subtle and precise reflection on what we have conceived is called conceptualization.
For example, the concept of grain exists in everybody as something simple, by means of
which we recognize grain as soon as we see it. But when we examine grain in detail we
come to consider more things about it and use different designations to indicate the
different things that we have conceived. For the same grain can be called at one time
‘fruit,’ at another time ‘seed,’ and again at another time ‘nourishment’ It is ‘fruit’ as the
66
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result of farming that has been completed, ‘seed’ as the beginning of farming to come,
and ‘nourishment’ as what is suitable for the development of the body of one who eats it.
Now each one of these things mentioned is considered by way of conceptualization; each
of these is not dissolved together with the noise of the tongue, but rather the concepts
remain settled in the soul of the one who has conceived them.68
Basil does not relegate epinoia to the backburner of knowledge. The difference between the
Cappadocians and Eunomius lies in the ability or inability to know God’s essence. By denying
the role of epinoia in theology, Eunomius gives the imagination no place in the realm of
theology because he believes the essence of God can be known objectively. And when it is
known, the essence of God is simple which further strengthens the case in his mind against
epinoia which results in a God who seems composite. However, the Cappadocians acknowledge
man’s inability to know God’s essence. Therefore, epinoia and the imagination become the only
way to know God. God remains simple in essence, but his names are all humanity has to speak
of, and even these are symbolic and distanced from God for they are always made in relation to
creation which is diastemic. Douglass provides an excellent summation of the conscious move to
epinoia in light of diastema and kinesis and its subsequent costs:
At first glance, the corn seems simple and uncomplicated. Upon further epinoetic
reflection, though, all the different aspects of the corn—size, shape, color, hardness, etc.,
as well as the various potential uses of corn—come into view. What had initially seemed
simple is now understood to be both physically composite and implicated in a whole
matrix of complex agricultural, social and economic relationships. Even though the
essence of corn was never the object of this epinoetic process, the resultant thoughts,
embedding corn in its manifestation-in-the-world, in its Lebenswelt, did overcome a
certain type of alienation that had existed between Basil and the corn. The price, though,
of this movement was a different type of alienation, the acknowledgement that one could
not approach the corn’s essence.69
The Cappadocians are not shy in stating the limitations of the imagination. The background of
epinoia places it in the less real than material concrete existences. However, their conception of
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the state of humankind as creation leaves them with no choice but to walk forward championing
the imagination as the only way in which God can be thought of and spoken of. His essence
cannot be known, only his activity.70 And his activity can only be reflected on using the
imagination. At each point of reflection there is further distance created, and upon the creation of
language about God, even more distance is created as he is spoken of and conceived of in the
diasteme. The imagination and epinoia as stated above,71 is thus always working in the world of
metaphor, as it makes connections between what it knows in the diasteme.
Epinoia and the Imagination at Work
Thus, the Cappadocians take a measured step back to the weak speech and
conceptualizations of the epinoia away from the supposedly strong place of uncreated, Godgiven concepts. They understand the weakness of the imagination in apprehending timeless
truths, yet speak of God using epinoia in spite of that. We characterized Eunomius above as the
thinker who was looking for a way to a non-symbolic way of talking about God, something to
ground his theology. In comparison, we might characterize the Cappadocians as those who
believe no such stable ground exists. A ground does indeed exist, but one that is shaky at best.
To use epinoia in theology is a calculated risk. Yet, it is the only way of speaking about God. So,
rather than be completely silent, the Cappadocians make use of the imagination to speak about
God.72 Gregory of Nazianzus provides a unique example of the way the Cappadocians balance
the imaginative conception and speaking of God with the reverence of apophaticism, or the
acceptance that epinoia can only take the human so far. The following quote is a poem:
For he stripped off none of his Godhead in bringing my salvation,
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a physician who descended to the world of the evil-smelling passions.
He was mortal, yet God, of the seed of David, but still the moulder of Adam’s form.
He bore flesh, yet existed outside the body.
He is son of a mother, yet she is a virgin. He was subject to limitations, yet beyond
measure.
A manger received him, while the Magi were lead by a star, as they came bringing gifts
and bending their knees in worship.
As a mortal man he came to the struggle, yet unconquered he prevailed over the tempter
in the threefold conflict.73
This poem is fraught with antitheses, or two concepts which appear opposite. Jesus’ humanity is
always counterbalanced with a statement about his divinity. This poem takes us further into the
Cappadocian understanding of epinoia and the imagination. Epinoia and epinoetic, imaginative
thinking creates metaphors within the diasteme. These are created by way of oscillation.
According to Douglass, “any knowledge of God can only emerge within a constant oscillation,
within an overlapping of names, images and concepts whose relationship with each other is one
of balance—not synthesis.”74 This oscillation creates a surplus of meaning. That is, by using a
multitude of overlapping images, names and concepts a greater amount of meaning is created
than what is needed.75 In this way, we can say that Cappadocian thought is analogical. Language
is neither univocal nor equivocal. It rests somewhere in between in a balance between the two.
As a result, stabilization from outside the metaphor itself is needed.76 This stabilization comes
from the apophatic assertions which are made by the theologian. Douglass again provides a very
illustrative and helpful quote. He writes,
The apophatic in the Cappadocians primarily served epinoetically to protect spaces of
meaning, spaces created by paradoxical assertions, from being understood in heretical
fashions. That is, there are gaps between apophatic negations and the metaphorical
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constructions they “protect.” This is protection against the kineticism of language—the
natural expansion of kinetic discourse beyond its delimited area of applicability.77
In other words, what stabilizes the epinoetic thinking and epinoia from falling off the knife’s
edge into fiction, are apophatic assertions. The Cappadocians, rather than using apophaticism to
speak of God, use apophaticism to protect positive speech about God. This is what differentiaties
them from authors such as Psuedo-Dionysius who would later champion apophatic assertions as
the only way to speak of God. Rather than asserting that we can only say what God is not, the
Cappadocian Fathers claim that we can use statements of what God is not to structure statements
about who God is.
Therefore, we see to a greater extent the cautious optimism the Cappadocian Fathers have
with epinoia and the imagination. They are cautious because with Eunomius, they understand the
“fictive” power of epinoetic thinking. Yet they are optimistic because they also understand the
multitude of positive achievements which have been discovered and created as a result of it.78 It
is the only way forward, but the way forward must be walked carefully.
We thus conclude our discussion of the Cappadocian understanding of the imagination
and thus, their understanding of epinoia as well. They see the imagination as the only way
forward for theology. Such an understanding is what put them at odds with Eunomius in their
doctrine of God as well. The Cappadocians could uphold a homoiousian or even homoousian
position (which they did) because God’s essence was not known. Unbegotten became another
epinoiai of God. It was not his essence, but rather a conceptualization of him based on the
conclusions that can be drawn from God’s activity in the world. The Cappadocian Fathers were
vital not only in the refutation of Eunomius’ doctrine of God, but also in the success and
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widespread adoption of a pro-Nicene position as it was accomplished at the Council of
Constantinople.
Concluding Thoughts
We now turn to the application of the thoughts of Gregory, Gregory and Basil on the
imagination for today. Does their conception of the imagination as vital for theology teach us
anything in our current context? I believe we can learn three lessons from the Cappadocian
understanding of the imagination. The first is that a reverence is necessary when doing theology
and speaking about God. The Cappadocian conception of the imagination places the speaking
about God done through epinoia in the category of risk because of the transcendence of God.
The Cappadocians unmistakably have a lofty view of God, and their reverence is refreshing to
behold. While all theology is done from an assumption that God is transcendent, that
presupposition does not unfailingly project into all theology. Their reverence is thus a reminder
that in God’s transcendence is not an attribute which can be given lip service alone. Even in a
high view of human language and thought, God is far and above what we can conceive and
articulate. As a result we can learn from the Cappadocians to be carefully optimistic in our
speaking about God.
Second, we can learn something about ecumenism and theological dialogue from the
Cappadocians and honestly, from the entire Nicene debates. Polemicism ran rampant during the
fourth century debates regarding the Trinitarian controversy. Athanasius managed to paint a
diverse, less radical position as Arian, resulting in the unnecessary showdown between east and
west. In the more immediate context of the Eunomian Controversy, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory
of Nyssa and Eunomius of Cyzicus certainly created characterizations of each other which were
inaccurate and the result of anger and polemic tactics. The language which is especially used by
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Gregory and Basil is harsh and meant to create an image of Eunomius which is arrogant and selfassuming.
Third, and most importantly, I believe the Cappadocians can help to restore a corrected
view of the imagination and its use in theology to the contemporary theological forum. Paul Avis
in his discussion of the current state of the imagination in theology, places the contemporary
situation as somewhere between modern conceptions of the imagination and post modern
conceptions of the imagination. That is, the imagination is either seen as an inaccurate and
irrational tool of pre-modern civilizations which was used to create silly stories to explain what
rational, scientific thinking can explain with certainty, or as the genesis of narratives and
metanarratives which are looked on with scorn and contempt.79 There has been a considerable
attempt to restore the imagination to its proper place and I believe the Cappadocians
understanding of the imagination can aid that cause because it restores the imagination as the
creator of metaphor, and then takes one step further to support the cognitive value of metaphors.
The Cappadocian understanding of the world makes epinoia and the imagination the only
way forward from our place within the diastema and kinesis of creation. The concepts or
conceptualizations which are the result of imaginative thinking about an object are by nature of
their location within the diasteme metaphorical. That is they are understood by way of their
connection with other creations in the diasteme. The Cappadocians do not see this as the ideal
way of knowing, they long at times to know the essence of God, yet metaphors are a way of
knowing. It does do something to remove the alienation between the knower and the object
which it desires to know while stopping short of saying anything about that object’s essence. In
the words of Vanhoozer, “Metaphors thus, have explanatory power, if not quite explanatory
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power.”80 The choice to use the imagination in theology is an intentional step to know
something, while also relinquishing the desire to know everything. The Cappadocian conception
of the imagination places it as that cognitive tool which allows for something between a certainty
of knowing and complete and utter silence towards God. It calls us to return again to the
metaphors, myths and symbols which make up the form and character of God’s revelation to
humanity in the Bible and Jesus and allowing them to speak as such. They call us to embrace our
creaturely nature instead of setting out to shed it as soon as possible. In the face of modernity’s
attempt at certainty, and postmodernity’s attempt at complete and utter uncertainty, the
Cappadocians seem to call us to some middle ground. Positive knowledge is possible given a
corrected understanding of the imagination, and yet that positive knowledge will always be
enmeshed in humanness in “createdness” thereby selling it short of that type of knowledge which
is God’s alone to possess.
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